DOMParser: parseFromString() method

Syntax

parseFromString(input, mimeType)

Parameters

input

A TrustedHTML or string instance defining HTML to be parsed. The markup must contain either an HTML, XML, XHTML, or SVG document.

mimeType

A string that specifies whether the XML parser or the HTML parser is used to parse the string.

Allowed values are:

• text/html
• text/xml
• application/xml
• application/xhtml+xml
• image/svg+xml

Return value

A Document with contentType matching the given mimeType.

Exceptions

TypeError

This is thrown when:

• mimeType is passed a value that is not one of the allowed values.
• input is passed a string value when Trusted Types are enforced by a CSP and no default policy is defined.

Description

The parseFromString() method parses an input containing either HTML or XML, returning a Document with the contentType matching the mimeType. This Document contains a complete in-memory DOM that is separate from the main document in the associated page.

If the mimeType is text/html the input is parsed as HTML and <script> elements are marked as non-executable, events are not fired, and event handlers aren't called to run inline scripts. While the document can download resources specified in <iframe> and <img> elements, it is essentially inert. This is ueful because you can parse HTML inputs that include declarative shadow roots, and perform operations on the document without affecting the visible page. For example, you can use this to sanitize the input tree, and inject parts of the input into the visible DOM when needed.

For the other allowed values (text/xml, application/xml, application/xhtml+xml, and image/svg+xml) the input is parsed as XML. This is useful if you want to import XML files, validate their structure, and extract data. If the input doesn't represent well-formed XML, the returned document will contain a <parsererror> node describing the nature of the parsing error.

Disallowed mimeType values cause a TypeError to be thrown.

Security considerations

This method parses its input into a separate in-memory DOM, disabling any <script> elements and stopping event handlers from running. While the returned document is effectively inert, event handlers and scripts in its DOM will be able to run if they are inserted into the visible DOM. The method is therefore a possible vector for Cross-site-scripting (XSS) attacks, where potentially unsafe input is first parsed into a Document without being sanitizied, and then injected into the visible/active DOM where code is able to run.

You should mitigate this risk by always passing TrustedHTML objects instead of strings, and enforcing trusted types using the require-trusted-types-for CSP directive. This ensures that the input is passed through a transformation function, which has the chance to sanitize the input to remove potentially dangerous markup (such as <script> elements and event handler attributes), before it is injected.

Using TrustedHTML makes it possible to audit and check that sanitization code is effective in just a few places, rather than scattered across all your injection sinks. You should not need to pass a sanitizer to the method when using TrustedHTML.

Note that even if you sanitize the input of elements and attributes that can execute code, you still need to be careful when taking any user input. For example, your page might use data in an XML document to fetch files that it then executes.

Examples

Parsing an input using Trusted Types

In this example we'll safely parse a potentially harmful HTML input and then inject it into the DOM of the visible page.

To mitigate the risk of XSS, we'll create a TrustedHTML object from the string containing the HTML. Trusted types are not yet supported on all browsers, so first we define the trusted types tinyfill. This acts as a transparent replacement for the trusted types JavaScript API:

if (typeof trustedTypes === "undefined")
  trustedTypes = { createPolicy: (n, rules) => rules };

Next we create a TrustedTypePolicy that defines a createHTML() for transforming an input string into TrustedHTML instances. Commonly, implementations of createHTML() use a library such as DOMPurify to sanitize the, input as shown below:

const policy = trustedTypes.createPolicy("my-policy", {
  createHTML: (input) => DOMPurify.sanitize(input),
});

Then we use this policy object to create a TrustedHTML object from the potentially unsafe input string and parse it into a Document. Note that the resulting Document will represent a complete HTML document with a root <html>, <head> and <body>, even though the input does not have these elements:

// The potentially malicious string
const untrustedString = "<p>I might be XSS</p><img src='x' onerror='alert(1)'>";

// Create a TrustedHTML instance using the policy
const trustedHTML = policy.createHTML(untrustedString);

// Parse the TrustedHTML (which contains a trusted string)
const safeDocument = parser.parseFromString(trustedHTML, "text/html");

The safeDocument now contains a DOM that is sanitized of harmful elements according to our policy. Below we use Element.replaceWith() to replace the body of the visible DOM with the body of our document: scripts in the new body will run, as will code when event handlers are triggered.

document.body.replaceWith(safeDocument.body);

Parsing XML, SVG, and HTML

The code below shows how you use the method to parse each of the content types. While you should use trusted types in real code, here they are omitted for brevity.

const parser = new DOMParser();

const xmlString = "<warning>Beware of the tiger</warning>";
const doc1 = parser.parseFromString(xmlString, "application/xml");
console.log(doc1.contentType); // "application/xml"

const svgString = '<circle cx="50" cy="50" r="50"/>';
const doc2 = parser.parseFromString(svgString, "image/svg+xml");
console.log(doc2.contentType); // "image/svg+xml"

const htmlString = "<strong>Beware of the leopard</strong>";
const doc3 = parser.parseFromString(htmlString, "text/html");
console.log(doc3.contentType); // "text/html"

console.log(doc1.documentElement.textContent);
// "Beware of the tiger"

console.log(doc2.firstChild.tagName);
// "circle"

console.log(doc3.body.firstChild.textContent);
// "Beware of the leopard"

Note that the application/xml and image/svg+xml MIME types above are functionally identical — the latter does not include any SVG-specific parsing rules.

Error handling

When using the XML parser with a string that doesn't represent well-formed XML, the XMLDocument returned by parseFromString will contain a <parsererror> node describing the nature of the parsing error.

const parser = new DOMParser();

const xmlString = "<warning>Beware of the missing closing tag";
const doc = parser.parseFromString(xmlString, "application/xml");
const errorNode = doc.querySelector("parsererror");
if (errorNode) {
  // parsing failed
} else {
  // parsing succeeded
}

Additionally, the parsing error may be reported to the browser's JavaScript console.

Specifications

Browser compatibility

See also

• XMLSerializer
• JSON.parse() - counterpart for JSON documents.